Jones v. American Economy Insurance Co., 672 S.W.2d 879 (Texas Court of Appeals, 1984) 

This is a suit to recover under a Texas standard homeowner's insurance policy. The questions presented are whether losses caused by a squirrel are excluded from coverage when the policy excludes losses caused by "vermin" and whether the trial court erred in finding that the insureds, Stafford and Doris Jones, failed to prove their damages. We hold that losses caused by a squirrel are not excluded from coverage under the policy. We also hold that the Joneses brought forward sufficient evidence of their damages. Consequently, we reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment for the Joneses. 

The Joneses sued American Economy Insurance Company to recover under their homeowner's policy for the damage caused by a squirrel when it got into their house. The trial court concluded as a matter of law that a squirrel is a "vermin" as that term is used in the exclusionary clause of the policy. The pertinent language of the exclusion in question is as follows: 
  
i. Loss caused by inherent vice, wear and tear, deterioration; rust, rot, mold or other fungi; dampness of atmosphere, extreme of temperature; contamination; vermin, termites, moths or other insects; (Emphasis supplied)
  
The word "vermin" is not defined in the policy, and "vermin" has no established meaning in the law of insurance. We must, therefore, determine whether the term has a readily ascertainable meaning in the plain ordinary sense of the word. Courts often turn to the dictionary to make this determination.

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 1301 (1974) defines "vermin" as "small common harmful or objectional animals (as lice or fleas) that are difficult to control...birds and mammals that prey on game...an offensive person." The word is derived from, or related to, the Latin word, "vermis," for "worm." "Squirrel" is defined, Webster, 1130, as "any of small or medium-sized rodents...as...any of numerous new or old World arboreal forms having long bushy tails and strong hind legs."

The Joneses maintain that "vermin" is not a particular class of animals, such as rodents, to which squirrels belong. It is apparent that the definition of "vermin" is very broad, covering entities as diverse as insects, animals, and persons. The few cases we have found in other jurisdictions are divided on this question. We conclude that the term does not have a simple, plain, and generally accepted meaning and that it is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation; therefore, we hold that the term is ambiguous.

When a term used in an exclusionary clause is ambiguous, the courts will apply the interpretation which permits recovery. The effect of a comprehensive policy, one which covers "all risks of physical loss," is generally to broaden the coverage. The courts will not write a limitation into a policy where none exists.

Because insurance policies are interpreted and construed liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer, particularly when dealing with exceptions and words of limitation, we hold that the term "vermin" does not include a squirrel and, thus, that the damage done to the Joneses' home by a squirrel is not an excluded loss under the terms of the policy.